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In this paper, we present new results on the fair and ecient allocation of indivisible goods to agents that
have monotone, submodular, non-additive valuation functions over bundles. Despite their simple structure,
these agent valuations are a natural model for several real-world domains. We show that, if such a valuation
function has binary marginal gains, a socially optimal (i.e. utilitarian social welfare-maximizing) allocation
that achieves envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) exists and is computationally tractable. We also prove that
the Nash welfare-maximizing and the leximin allocations both exhibit this fairness-eciency combination, by
showing that they can be achieved by minimizing any symmetric strictly convex function over utilitarian
optimal outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst valuation function class not subsumed by
additive valuations for which it has been established that an allocation maximizing Nash welfare is EF1.
Moreover, for a subclass of these valuation functions based on maximum (unweighted) bipartite matching, we
show that a leximin allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
1 INTRODUCTION
How should a collection of goods be divided amongst a population of agents with subjective valua-
tions? Are there computationally ecient methods for nding good allocations? ese questions
have been the focus of intense study in the CS/Econ community in recent years. Several criteria of
justice have been proposed in the literature. Some criteria focus on agent welfare: for example,
Pareto optimality, a popular criterion of allocative eciency, stipulates that there is no other allo-
cation that improves one agent’s valuation without hurting another. Other criteria consider how
agents perceive their bundles as compared to others’ allocation; a key concept here is one of envy:
an agent envies another if she believes that her bundle is worth less than that of another’s [Foley,
1967]. Envy-free (EF) allocations that are also Pareto optimal or even complete (i.e. each item is
allocated to at least one agent) are not guaranteed to exist when the items under consideration are
indivisible: consider the case of two agents and one valuable item — assigning the item to any one
of them results in envy by the other. is naturally leads to the notion of envy-freeness up to one
good (EF1) [Budish, 2011]: for every pair of agents i and j, j’s bundle contains some item whose
removal results in i not envying j; Lipton et al. [2004] provide a polynomial-time algorithm for
computing a complete EF1 allocation.
Of particular interest are methods that simultaneously achieve several desiderata. When agent
valuations are additive, i.e. the value for a bundle is the sum of the values for its individual items,
Caragiannis et al. [2016] show that allocations that satisfy both envy-freeness up to one item and
Pareto optimality (PO) exist, specically the ones that maximize the product of agents’ utilities
— also known as max Nash welfare (MNW). Barman et al. [2018a,b] show that an allocation with
these properties can be computed in (pseudo-)polynomial time. Indeed, most work on the fair
and ecient allocation of indivisible goods has focused on the additive seing; at present, lile is
known in this respect about other classes of valuation functions. is is where our work comes in.
∗is author contributed to this work while he was at National University of Singapore.
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1.1 Our contributions
We focus on monotone submodular valuations with binary marginal gains that we refer to as
(0, 1)-SUB valuations. is class of valuations naturally arises in many practical applications.
For example, suppose that a government body wishes to fairly allocate public goods to individuals
of dierent minority groups (say, in accordance with a diversity promoting policy). is could apply
to the assignment of kindergarten slots to children from dierent neighborhoods/socioeconomic
classes [U.S. Department of Education, Oce of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2017],
or of ats in public housing estates to applicants of dierent ethnicities [Deng et al., 2013]. A
possible way of achieving group fairness in this seing is to model each minority group as an
agent (i.e. an agent consists of many individuals) such that each agent’s valuation function is based
on optimally matching items to its constituents – then, envy naturally captures the notion that
no group should believe that other groups were oered beer bundles (this is the fairness notion
studied in [Benabbou et al., 2019]). Assignment-based valuations naturally arise in other domains:
consider an allocation mechanism assigning students to courses; each student has a set of courses
she would like to take, which t into her schedule in a certain manner. us, a student’s valuation
function is induced by a maximal matching of courses to her schedule (as opposed to the additive
course allocation model more commonly used, e.g. by Budish [2011]). Matching-based valuations
are non-additive in general and, in fact, constitute a signicant subclass of submodular valuations
called OXS valuations [Leme, 2017].
e binary marginal gains assumption is best understood in context of matching-based valuations
— in this scenario, it simply means that individuals either approve or disapprove items, and do not
distinguish among items they approve (we call OXS functions with binary individual preferences
(0, 1)-OXS valuations). is is a reasonable assumption in kindergarten slot allocation (all ap-
proved/available slots are identical), and is implicitly made in some public housing mechanisms (e.g.
when selecting ats in the Singapore public housing system, individuals need to eectively approve
a set of ats by selecting a block, and are precluded from expressing a more rened preference
model).
In addition, imposing certain constraints on the underlying matching problem retains the sub-
modularity of the agents’ induced valuation functions: if there is a hard limit (due to a budget or an
exogenous quota) on the number of items each group is allowed (or able) to receive — such quotas
exist in both the Singapore public housing system (ethnicity-based), and in allocating kindergarten
slots in many U.S. cities (socioeconomic status-based) — then agents’ valuations are truncated
matching-based valuations. Such valuation functions are not OXS, but still submodular. Our results
apply to this broader class, as agents still have binary/dichotomous preferences over items.
e following are our main existential and computational results on the compatibility of (ap-
proximate) envy-freeness with welfare-based allocation concepts (see also Figure 1 and Table 1).
(a) For (0, 1)-SUB valuations, we show that an EF1 allocation that also maximizes the utilitarian
social welfare or USW (hence is Pareto optimal) always exists and can be computed in
polynomial time.
(b) For (0, 1)-SUB valuations, we show that leximin1 and MNW allocations both possess the
EF1 property.
(c) For (0, 1)-SUB valuations, we provide a characterization of the leximin allocations; we show
that they are identical to the minimizers of any symmetric strictly convex function over
utilitarian optimal allocations. We obtain the same characterization for MNW allocations.
1Roughly speaking, a leximin allocation is one that maximizes the realized valuation of the worst-o agent and, subject to
that, maximizes that of the second worst-o agent, and so on.
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MNW Leximin max-USW+EF1
(0, 1)-OXS poly-time (eorem 3.1) poly-time (eorem 3.1) poly-time (eorem 2.4)
(0, 1)-SUB ? ? poly-time (eorem 2.4)
Table 1. Summary of our computational complexity results.
≡
≡
Fig. 1. Equivalences and implications among properties for the (0, 1)-SUB valuation class under clean alloca-
tions.
(d) For (0, 1)-OXS valuations, we show that both leximin and MNW allocations can be computed
eciently.
Result (a) is remarkably positive: the EF1 and utilitarian welfare objectives are incompatible in
general, even for additive valuations, as shown by Example A.1 in the appendix. In fact, maximizing
the utilitarian social welfare among all EF1 allocations is NP-hard for general valuations [Barman
et al., 2019]. Such strong welfare/fairness guarantees are not known even for simple classes such as
binary additive valuations (i.e. the value of a subset of items is the sum of the values of individual
items which are, in turn, valued at either 0 or 1 each), which are subsumed by the (0, 1)-SUB class.
Result (b) is reminiscent of the main theorem in Caragiannis et al. [2016], showing that any
MNW allocation is PO and EF1 under additive valuations; they also showed that a PO and EF1
allocation may not exist under subadditive/supermodular valuations (eorem 3.3) and MNW
does not imply EF1 for arbitrary, real-valued submodular functions but le the PO+EF1 existence
question open for the submodular class. e open questions in this paper have received substantial
aention in recent literature (for instance, progress has been made on EFX or envy-freeness up
to the least valued item, see e.g. [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018]) but the PO+EF1 existence issue
beyond additive valuations is yet to be seled. To our knowledge, (0, 1)-SUB is the rst valuation
class not subsumed by additive valuations for which the EF1 property of the MNW allocation and
multiple alternative ways of achieving the PO+EF1 combination have been established. e other
properties of the MNW principle that we have uncovered for this valuation class (results (b) and
(c)) may be of independent interest (see the discussion in Section 4).
Our computational tractability results (d) are signicant since we know that for arbitrary real
valuations, it is NP-hard to compute the following types of allocations: PO+EF even for the seemingly
simple class of binary additive valuations which is subsumed by our (0, 1)-SUB class (Bouveret
and Lang [2008] Proposition 21); leximin [Beza´kova´ and Dani, 2005]; and MNW [Nguyen et al.,
2014]. Moreover, although previous work on binary additive valuations established the polynomial
time-solvability of MNW (and thus nding a PO and EF1 allocation) via a clever algorithm based
on a subtle running time analysis [Barman et al., 2018b], we extend this result to the strictly
larger (0, 1)-OXS class by uncovering deeper connections to the rich literature on combinatorial
optimization.
From a technical perspective, our work makes extensive use of tools and concepts from matroid
theory. For instance, most of our results are based on an observation that the set of clean bundles
(i.e. bundles containing no item with zero marginal value for the agent under consideration) forms
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the set of independent sets of a matroid for every agent. While some papers have explored the
application of matroid theory to the fair division problem [Biswas and Barman, 2018, Gourve`s
and Monnot, 2017], we believe that ours is the rst to demonstrate its strong connection with
fairness and eciency guarantees. We defer omied proofs and examples to the appendix for ease
of exposition.
1.2 Related work
Our paper is related to the active area of research on the fair allocation of indivisible goods. Budish
[2011] was the rst to formalize the notion of EF1; but, it implicitly appeared in Lipton et al. [2004],
who designed a polynomial time algorithm that returns an EF1 allocation for arbitrary monotone
valuations (called the envy graph algorithm). Caragiannis et al. [2016] prove that EF1 and Pareto
optimal allocations exist for non-negative additive valuations; Barman et al. [2018a] subsequently
provide a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for computing such allocations. Closely related to
ours is the work of Barman et al. [2018b], who developed an ecient greedy algorithm to nd
an MNW allocation when the valuation of each agent is a concave function that depends on the
number of items approved by her. We note that this class of valuations does not subsume the class
of (0, 1)-OXS valuations since bundles of the same number of approved items may have dierent
values under the laer class;2 hence the polynomial-time complexity result of Barman et al. [2018a]
does not imply eorem 3.1.
In this paper, we admit allocations that may be incomplete (i.e. not all items are allocated to the
agents under consideration) but satisfy strong fairness and eciency guarantees. One motivation
for our paper is recent work by Benabbou et al. [2019] on promoting diversity in assignment
problems through ecient, EF1 allocations of bundles to aribute-based groups in the population.
Other work in this vein includes fairness/diversity through quotas [Aziz et al., 2019, Benabbou et al.,
2018, Suzuki et al., 2018, and references therein], or by the optimization of carefully constructed
functions [Ahmed et al., 2017, Dickerson et al., 2019, Lang and Skowron, 2016, and references
therein] in allocation/subset selection.
We note that Lipton et al. [2004]’s classic envy graph algorithm does not guarantee Pareto
optimality (although the output allocation satises completeness). A summary of this algorithm
follows: in each iteration, a new item is allocated to an arbitrary agent not currently envied by
any other agent; the envy graph is constructed by drawing a directed edge from an agent to every
agent it envies; if a cycle forms in the graph, it is eliminated by transferring bundles from envied
to envious agent on the (reverse) cycle, starting with the smallest cycle in case of overlapping
cycles. We can augment the rst step of the above algorithm with a natural heuristic: allocate
the item under consideration to an agent that has the maximum marginal gain from it, breaking
ties arbitrarily — for valuations with binary marginal gains, this is equivalent to giving the item
to an agent whose marginal gain for it (given its current bundle) is 1, and to an arbitrary agent
if none has non-zero marginal gain for it. Here is a simple example with (0, 1)-SUB valuations
where the output of this approach may not be Pareto optimal: consider 2 agents and 2 items such
that v1(o1) = v1(o2) = v1(o1,o2) = 1, v2(o1) = v2(o1,o2) = 1 and v2(o2) = 0. Lipton et al. [2004]’s
algorithm may assign o1 to agent 1; then o2 will be arbitrarily allocated, resulting in an allocation
A with v1(A1) = 1 and v1(A2) = 0. is is Pareto dominated by A′1 = {o2}, A′2 = {o1} where each
2Consider 3 items, o1, o2, o3, and a group of members S = {1, 2, 3} with member 1 assigning weight 1 to items o1 and o3,
and members 2 and 3 assigning weight 1 to item o2 only. e value of a maximum matching between {o1, o2 } and S is 2
while the value of a maximum matching between {o1, o3 } and S is 1.
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agent realizes a valuation of 1. e myopic3, sequential nature of the algorithm results in this
undesirable outcome.
2 MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
roughout the paper, given a positive integer r , let [r ] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , r }. We are given
a set N = [n] of agents, and a set O = {o1, . . . ,om} of items or goods. Subsets of O are referred
to as bundles, and each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function vi : 2O → R+ over bundles where
vi (∅) = 0.4 We further assume polynomial-time oracle access to the valuation vi of all agents.
Given a valuation function vi : 2O → R, we dene the marginal gain of an item o ∈ O w.r.t. a
bundle S ⊆ O , as ∆i (S ;o) , vi (S ∪ {o})−vi (S). A valuation functionvi is monotone ifvi (S) ⊆ vi (T )
whenever S ⊆ T .
An allocation A of items to agents is a collection of n disjoint bundles A1, . . . ,An , such that⋃
i ∈N Ai ⊆ O ; the bundle Ai is allocated to agent i . Given an allocation A, we denote by A0 the set
of unallocated items, also referred to as withheld items. We may refer to agent i’s valuation of its
bundle vi (Ai ) under the allocation A as its realized valuation under A. An allocation is complete if
every item is allocated to some agent, i.e. A0 = ∅. We admit incomplete, but clean allocations: a
bundle S ⊆ O is clean for i ∈ N if it contains no item o ∈ S for which agent i has zero marginal
gain (i.e., ∆i (S \ {o};o) = 0); allocation A is clean if each allocated bundle Ai is clean for the agent
i that receives it. It is easy to ‘clean’ any allocation without changing any realized valuation by
iteratively revoking items of zero marginal gain from respective agents and placing them in A0.
For example, if for agent i , vi ({1}) = vi ({2}) = vi ({1, 2}) = 1, then the bundle Ai = {1, 2} is not
clean for agent i (and neither is any allocation where i receives items 1 and 2) but it can be cleaned
by moving item 1 (or item 2 but not both) to A0.
2.1 Fairness and eiciency criteria
Our fairness criteria are based on the concept of envy. Agent i envies agent j under an allocation
A if vi (Ai ) < vi (Aj ). An allocation A is envy-free (EF) if no agent envies another. We will use the
following relaxation of the EF property due to Budish [2011]: we say thatA is envy-free up to one good
(EF1) if, for every i, j ∈ N , i does not envy j or there exists o in Aj such that vi (Ai ) ≥ vi (Aj \ {o}).
e eciency concept that we are primarily interested in is Pareto optimality. An allocation A′ is
said to Pareto dominate the allocation A if vi (A′i ) ≥ vi (Ai ) for all agents i ∈ N and vj (A′j ) > vj (Aj )
for some agent j ∈ N . An allocation is Pareto optimal (or PO for short) if it is not Pareto dominated
by any other allocation.
ere are several ways of measuring the welfare of an allocation [Sen, 1970]. Specically, given
an allocation A,
• its utilitarian social welfare is USW(A) , ∑ni=1vi (Ai );
• its egalitarian social welfare is ESW(A) , mini ∈N vi (Ai );
• its Nash welfare is NW(A) ,∏i ∈N vi (Ai ).
An allocation A is said to be utilitarian optimal (respectively, egalitarian optimal) if it maximizes
USW(A) (respectively, ESW(A)) among all allocations. Since it is possible that the maximum aainable
Nash welfare is 0, we dene the maximum Nash social welfare (MNW) allocation as follows: given
a problem instance, we nd a largest subset of agents, say Nmax ⊆ N , to which we can allocate
bundles of positive values, and compute an allocation to agents in Nmax that maximizes the product
3e algorithm is myopic in the sense that the allocation of a new item in each iteration does not take into account its
downstream impact on eciency and is only geared towards maintaining the EF1 invariant.
4e property vi (∅) = 0 is called normalization in the literature.
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of their realized valuations. If Nmax is not unique, we choose the one that results in the highest
product of realized valuations.
e leximin welfare is a lexicographic renement of the maximin welfare concept. Formally,
for real n-dimensional vectors x and y, x is lexicographically greater than or equal to y (denoted
by x ≥L y) if and only if x = y, or x , y and for the minimum index j such that x j , yj we have
x j > yj . For each allocation A, we denote by θ (A) the vector of the components vi (Ai ) (i ∈ N )
arranged in non-decreasing order. A leximin allocation A is an allocation that maximizes the
egalitarian welfare in a lexicographic sense, i.e., θ (A) ≥L θ (A′) for any other allocation A′.
2.2 Submodular valuations
e main theme of all results in this section is that, when all agents have (0, 1)-SUB valuations,
fairness and eciency properties are compatible with each other and also with the optimal values of
all three welfare functions we consider. Lemma 2.1 below shows that Pareto optimality of optimal
welfare is unsurprising; but, it is non-trivial to prove the EF1 property in each case.
Lemma 2.1. For monotone valuations, every utilitarian optimal, MNW, and leximin allocation is
Pareto optimal.
Before proceeding further, we state some useful properties of the (0, 1)-SUB valuation class.
Proposition 2.2. A valuation function vi with binary marginal gains is always monotone and
takes values in [|S |] for any input bundle S (hence vi (S) ≤ |S |).
is property leads us to the following equivalence between the size and realized valuation of
every clean, allocated bundle for the valuation subclass under consideration — a crucial component
in all our proofs. Note that cleaning any optimal-welfare allocation leaves the welfare unaltered
and ensures that each resulting withheld item is of zero marginal gain to each agent; hence it
preserves the PO condition.
Proposition 2.3. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, A is a clean allocation if
and only if vi (Ai ) = |Ai | for each i ∈ N .
A simple example of one good and two agents shows that an envy-free and Pareto optimal
allocation may not exist even under (0, 1)-SUB valuations. is justies our quest for EF1 and
Pareto-optimal allocations.
2.3 Utilitarian optimal and EF1 allocation
For non-negative additive valuations, Caragiannis et al. [2016] prove that every MNW allocation is
Pareto optimal and EF1. However, the existence question of an allocation satisfying the PO and
EF1 properties remains open for submodular valuations. We show that the existence of a PO+EF1
allocation [Caragiannis et al., 2016] extends to the class of submodular valuations with binary
marginal gains. In fact, we provide a surprisingly strong relation between eciency and fairness:
both utilitarian optimality (stronger than Pareto optimality) and EF1 turn out to be compatible
under (0, 1)-SUB valuations!
Theorem 2.4. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, a utilitarian optimal alloca-
tion that is also EF1 exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
Our result is constructive: we provide a way of computing the above allocation in Algorithm 1.
e proof of eorem 2.4 and those of the laer theorems utilize Lemmas 2.5 and 2.6 which shed
light on the interesting interaction between envy and (0, 1)-SUB valuations.
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Lemma 2.5 (Transferability property). For monotone submodular valuation functions, if agent
i envies agent j under an allocation A, then there is an item o ∈ Aj for which i has a positive marginal
gain.
Proof. Assume that agent i envies agent j under an allocation A, i.e. vi (Ai ) < vi (Aj ), but no
item o ∈ Aj has a positive marginal gain, i.e., ∆i (Ai ;o) = 0 for each o ∈ Aj . Let Aj = {o1,o2, . . . ,or }.
As in the proof of Proposition 2.2, if we dene S0 = ∅ and St = {o1,o2, . . . ,ot } for each t ∈ [r ], we
can write the following telescoping series:
vi (Ai ∪Aj ) −vi (Ai ) =
r∑
t=1
∆i (Ai ∪ St−1;ot ).
However, submodularity implies that for each t ∈ [r ], ∆i (Ai ∪ St−1;ot ) ≤ ∆i (Ai ;ot ) = 0, meaning
that
vi (Ai ∪Aj ) −vi (Ai ) =
r∑
t=1
∆i (Ai ∪ St−1;ot ) = 0.
Together with monotonicity, this yieldsvi (Aj ) ≤ vi (Ai ∪Aj ) = vi (Ai ) < vi (Aj ), a contradiction. 
Note that Lemma 2.5 holds for submodular functions with arbitrary real-valued marginal gains,
and is trivially true for (non-negative) additive valuations. However, there exist non-submodular
valuation functions that violate the transferability property, even when they have binary marginal
gains (see Example A.2 in the appendix).
Below, we show that if i’s envy towards j cannot be eliminated by removing one item, then the
sizes of their clean bundles dier by at least two. Formally, we say that agent i envies j up to more
than 1 item if Aj , ∅ and vi (Ai ) < vi (Aj \ {o}) for every o ∈ Aj .
Lemma 2.6. For submodular functions with binary marginal gains, if agent i envies agent j up to
more than 1 item under an allocation A and j’s bundle Aj is clean, then vj (Aj ) ≥ vi (Ai ) + 2.
Proof. From the denition: Aj , ∅ and vi (Ai ) < vi (Aj \ {o}) for every o ∈ Aj . Consider one
such o. From Proposition 2.2, vi (Aj \ {o}) ≤ |Aj \ {o}| = |Aj | − 1. Since Aj is a clean bundle for j,
Proposition 2.3 implies that vj (Aj ) = |Aj |. Combining these, we get
vi (Ai ) < vi (Aj \ {o}) ≤ |Aj | − 1 = vj (Aj ) − 1 ⇒ vj (Aj ) > vi (Ai ) + 1,
which proves the theorem statement since all valuations are integers. 
We are now ready to show that under (0, 1)-SUB valuations, utilitarian social welfare maximiza-
tion is polynomial-time solvable (2.7). To this end, we will exploit the fact that the set of clean
bundles forms the set of independent sets of a matroid. We start by introducing some notions from
matroid theory. Formally, a matroid is an ordered pair (E,I), where E is some nite set and I
is a family of its subsets (referred to as the independent sets of the matroid), which satises the
following three axioms:
(I1) ∅ ∈ I,
(I2) if Y ∈ I and X ⊆ Y , then X ∈ I, and
(I3) if X ,Y ∈ I and |X | > |Y |, then there exists x ∈ X \ Y
such that Y ∪ {x} ∈ I.
e rank function r : 2E → Z of a matroid returns the rank of each set X , i.e. the maximum size
of an independent subset of X . Another equivalent way to dene a matroid is to use the axiom
systems for a rank function. We require that (R1) r (X ) ≤ |X |, (R2) r is monotone, and (R3) r is
submodular. en, the pair (E,I) where I = {X ⊆ E | r (X ) = |X | } is a matroid.
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Theorem 2.7. For submodular functions with binary marginal gains, one can compute a clean
utilitarian optimal allocation in polynomial time.
Proof. We prove the claim by a reduction to the matroid intersection problem. Let E be the set
of pairs of items and agents, i.e., E = { {o, i} | o ∈ O ∧ i ∈ N }. For each i ∈ N and X ⊆ E, we dene
Xi to be the set of edges incident to i , i.e., Xi = { {o, i} ∈ X | o ∈ O }. Note that taking E = X , Ei is
the set of all edges in E incident to i ∈ N . For each i ∈ N and for each X ⊆ E, we dene ri (X ) to be
the valuation of i , under function vi (·), for the items o ∈ O such that {o, i} ∈ Xi ; namely,
ri (X ) = vi ({ o ∈ O | {o, i} ∈ Xi }).
Clearly, ri is also a submodular function with binary marginal gains; combining this with Proposition
2.2 and the fact that ri (∅) = 0, it is easy to see that each ri is a rank function of a matroid. us,
the set of clean bundles for i , i.e Ii = {X ⊆ E | ri (X ) = |X | }, is the set of independent sets of a
matroid. Taking the union I = I1 ∪ · · · ∪ In , the pair (E,I) is known to form a matroid [Korte and
Vygen, 2006], oen referred to as a union matroid. By denition, I = {⋃i ∈N Xi | Xi ∈ Ii ∧ i ∈ N },
so any independent set in I corresponds to a union of clean bundles for each i ∈ N and vice versa.
To ensure that each item is assigned at most once (i.e. bundles are disjoint), we will dene another
matroid (E,O) where the set of independent sets is given by
O = {X ⊆ E | |X ∩ Eo | ≤ 1,∀o ∈ O }.
Here, Eo = { e = {o, i} | i ∈ N } for o ∈ O . e pair (E,O) is known as a partition matroid [Korte
and Vygen, 2006].
Now, observe that a common independent set of the two matroids X ∈ O ∩ I corresponds to a
clean allocation A of our original instance where each agent i receives the items o with {o, i} ∈ X ;
indeed, each item o is allocated at most once because |Eo ∩ X | ≤ 1, and each Ai is clean because
the realized valuation of agent i under A is exactly the size of the allocated bundle. Conversely, any
clean allocation A of our instance corresponds to an independent set X =
⋃
i ∈N Xi ∈ I ∩ O, where
Xi = { {o, i} | o ∈ Ai }: for each i ∈ N , ri (Xi ) = |Xi | by Proposition 2.3, and hence Xi ∈ Ii , which
implies that X ∈ I; also, |X ∩ Eo | ≤ 1 as A is an allocation, and hence X ∈ O.
us, the maximum utilitarian social welfare is the same as the size of a maximum common
independent set in I ∩ O. It is well known that one can nd a largest common independent set in
two matroids in timeO(|E |3θ )where θ is the maximum complexity of the two independence oracles
[Edmonds, 1979]. Since the maximum complexity of checking independence in two matroids (E,O)
and (E,I) is bounded by O(mnF ) where F is the maximum complexity of the value query oracle,
we can nd a set X ∈ I ∩ O with maximum |X | in time O(|E |3mnF ). 
We are now ready to prove eorem 2.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Algorithm 1 maintains optimal USW as an invariant and terminates on
an EF1 allocation. Specically, we rst compute a clean allocation that maximizes the utilitarian
social welfare. e EIT subroutine in the algorithm iteratively diminshes envy by transferring an
item from the envied bundle to the envious agent; Lemma 2.5 ensures that there is always an item
in the envied bundle for which the envious agent has a positive marginal gain.
Correctness: Each EIT step maintains the optimal utilitarian social welfare as well as cleanness:
an envied agent’s valuation diminishes exactly by 1 while that of the envious agent increases by
exactly 1. us, if it terminates, the EIT subroutine retains the initial (optimal) USW and, by the
stopping criterion, induces the EF1 property. To show that the algorithm terminates in polynomial
time, we dene the potential function Φ(A) , ∑i ∈N vi (Ai )2.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for nding utilitarian optimal EF1 allocation
1 Compute a clean, utilitarian optimal allocation A.
2 /*Envy-Induced Transfers (EIT)*/
3 while there are two agents i, j such that i envies j more than 1 item. do
4 Find item o ∈ Aj with ∆i (Ai ;o) = 1.
5 Aj ← Aj \ {o}; Ai ← Ai ∪ {o}.
6 end
At each step of the algorithm, Φ(A) strictly decreases by 2 or a larger integer. To see this, let
A′ denote the resulting allocation aer reallocation of item o from agent j to i . Since A is clean,
we have vi (A′i ) = vi (Ai ) + 1 and vj (A′j ) = vj (Aj ) − 1; since all other bundles are untouched,
vk (A′k ) = vk (Ak ) for every k ∈ N \ {i, j}. Also, since i envies j up to more than one item under
allocation A, vi (Ai ) + 2 ≤ vj (Aj ) by Lemma 2.6. Combining these, we get
Φ(A′) − Φ(A) = (vi (Ai ) + 1)2 + (vj (Aj ) − 1)2 −vi (Ai )2 −vj (Aj )2
= 2(1 +vi (Ai ) −vj (Aj ))
≤ 2(1 − 2) = −2.
Complexity: It remains to analyze the running time of the algorithm. By eorem 2.7, computing
a clean utilitarian optimal allocation can be done in polynomial time. e value of the non-negative
potential function has a polynomial upper bound:
∑
i ∈N vi (Ai )2 ≤ (
∑
i ∈N vi (Ai ))2 ≤ m2. us,
Algorithm 1 terminates in polynomial time. 
An interesting implication of the above analysis is that a utilitarian optimal allocation that
minimizes
∑
i ∈N vi (Ai )2 is always EF1.
Corollary 2.8. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, any clean, utilitarian
optimal allocation A that minimizes Φ(A) , ∑i ∈N vi (Ai )2 among all utilitarian optimal allocations
is EF1.
Remark 1 (Choice of the potential function). In the proof of eorem 2.4, we used the sum
of squared valuations as the potential function to prove termination in polynomial time mainly for
ease of exposition. However, any symmetric, strictly convex,5 polynomial function of the realized
valuations strictly decreases with each EIT step and, as such, it would be sucient to use any such
function as our potential function; moreover, Corollary 2.8 holds for any such function Φ(·) as well
— we elaborate on this theme in Section 2.4.
Despite its simplicity, Algorithm 1 signicantly generalizes that of Benabbou et al. [2019]’s
eorem 4 (which ensures the existence of a non-wasteful EF1 allocation for (0, 1)-OXS valuations)
to (0, 1)-SUB valuations. We note, however, that the resulting allocation may be neither MNW nor
leximin even when agents have (0, 1)-OXS valuations: Example 2.9 below illustrates this and also
shows that the converse of Corollary 2.8 does not hold.
Example 2.9. e instance we use is Example 1 in Benabbou et al. [2019]. ere are two groups
(i.e. agents with (0, 1)-OXS valuations) and six items o1,o2,o3,o4,o5,o6. e rst group N1 (identical
to agent 1) contains four members a1,a2,a3,a4 and the second group N2 (identical to agent 2)
contains four members b1,b2,b3,b4; each individual has utility (weight) 1 for an item o if and only
if she is adjacent to o in the adjoining graph:
5It suces for the function to be strictly convex only over the non-negative orthant since valuations are always non-negative.
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a1
a2
a3
a4
o1
o2
o3
o4
o5
o6
b1
b2
b3
b4
e valuation function of each group for any bundle X is dened as the value (equivalently,
the size) of a maximum-size matching of X to the group’s members. e algorithm may initially
compute a utilitarian optimal allocation A that assigns items o1,o2,o3,o5 to the group N1 (with
these items assigned to a1,a2,a3,a4 respectively), and the remaining items to group N2 (with o4,o6
assigned to b2,b4 respectively). en, v1(A1) = 4 > 2 = v1(A2) and v2(A2) = 2 = v2(A1), hence
the allocation A is EF1 — in fact, envy-free! So, the EIT subroutine will not be invoked and the
output of Algorithm 1 will be A. However, the (unique) leximin and MNW allocation assigns items
o1,o2,o3 to the rst group, and the remaining items to the second group – this is also the (unique)
utilitarian optimal allocation with the minimum sum of squares of the agents’ valuations. 
Remark 2 (EFX allocation). It is worthwhile at this point to comment on the implications
of our results for a stronger version of the EF1 property that has received considerable aention
in recent literature: envy-freeness up to any item, oen called the EFX condition. ere are two
denitions in the literature:
(1) Caragiannis et al. [2016] who introduced this concept (for additive valuations) called it
envy-freeness up to the least (positively) valued good; we can naturally extend their denition
to general valuations as follows: an allocation A is EFX if, for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N
such that i envies j , vi (Ai ) ≥ vi (Aj \ {o}) for every item o ∈ Aj satisfying ∆i (Aj \ {o}) > 0.
We will call this property EFX+ for clarity.
(2) Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] dened an allocation A to be EFX if, for every pair of agents
i, j, vi (Ai ) ≥ vi (Aj \ {o}) ∀o ∈ Aj or equivalently vi (Ai ) ≥ maxo∈Aj vi (Aj \ {o}) — this
stronger denition favors allocations where more agents are envy-free of others since
vi (Aj \ {o}) = vi (Aj ) whenever o is of zero marginal value to agent i with respect to the
bundle Aj : the authors show that under this denition, no EFX allocation can be Pareto
optimal even for two agents with additive valuations or general but identical valuations.6
Caragiannis et al. [2019] and Chaudhury et al. [2019] use this denition as well. Following
Kyropoulou et al. [2019], who studied both the (above) weaker and (this) stronger variants
of approximate envy-freeness under a dierent valuation model, we call this stronger
property EFX0.
For (0, 1)-SUB valuations, all items with non-zero marginal values for an agent are also valued
identically at 1, hence EF1 trivially implies EFX+; eorem 2.4 and Corollary 2.8 further guarantee
the existence of an EFX+ and PO allocation for any instance under this valuation class. However,
6However, both their examples establishing negative results for these sets of conditions on the valuation functions involve
eliminating items with zero marginal value; their second example (for identical valuations) uses a non-submodular valuation
function.
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we demonstrate with Example A.3 with (0, 1)-OXS valuations in the appendix that even an EF1 and
utilitarian optimal (hence PO) allocation may not satisfy the EFX0 condition. 
2.4 MNW and Leximin allocation
We saw in Section 2.3 that under (0, 1)-SUB valuations, a simple iterative procedure allows us to
reach an EF1 allocation while preserving utilitarian optimality. However, as we previously noted,
such allocations are not necessarily leximin or MNW. In this subsection, we characterize the set of
leximin and MNW allocations under (0, 1)-SUB valuations. We start by showing that Pareto optimal
allocations coincide with utilitarian optimal allocations when agents have (0, 1)-SUB valuations.
Intuitively, if an allocation is not utilitarian optimal, one can always nd an ‘augmenting’ path that
makes at least one agent happier but no other agent worse o.
In the subsequent proof, we will use the following notions and results from matroid theory:
Given a matroid (E,I), the sets in 2E \ I are called dependent, and a minimal dependent set of a
matroid is called a circuit. e following is a crucial property of circuits.
Lemma 2.10 (Korte and Vygen [2006]). Let (E,I) be a matroid, X ∈ I, and y ∈ E \ X such that
X ∪ {y} < I. en the set X ∪ {y} contains a unique circuit.
Given a matroid (E,I), we denote by C(I,X ,y) the unique circuit contained in X ∪ {y} for any
X ∈ I and y ∈ E \ X such that X ∪ {y} < I.
Theorem 2.11. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, any Pareto optimal alloca-
tion is utilitarian optimal.
Proof. Dene E, Xi , Ei , Ii for i ∈ N , I, and O as in the proof of eorem 2.7. We rst observe
that for each X ∈ I and each y ∈ E \ X , if X ∪ {y} < I, then there is agent i ∈ N whose
corresponding items in Xi together with y is not clean, i.e., Xi ∪ {y} < Ii , which by Lemma 2.10
implies that the circuit C(I,X ,y) is contained in Ei , i.e.,
C(I,X ,y) = C(Ii ,X ,y). (2.1)
Now to prove the claim, let A be a Pareto optimal allocation. Without loss of generality, we
assume that A is clean. en, as we have seen before, A corresponds to a common independent set
X ∗ in I ∩ O given by
X ∗ =
⋃
i ∈N
{ e = {o, i} ∈ E | o ∈ Ai }.
Suppose towards a contradiction thatA does not maximize the utilitarian social welfare. is means
that X ∗ is not a largest common independent set of I and O. It is known that given two matroids
and their common independent set, if it is not a maximum-size common independent set, then
there is an ‘augmenting’ path [Edmonds, 1979].
To formally dene an augmenting path, we dene an auxiliary graph GX ∗ = (E,B(1)X ∗ ∪ B(2)X ∗ )
where the set of arcs is given by
B(1)X ∗ = { (x ,y) | y ∈ E \ X ∗ ∧ x ∈ C(O,X ∗,y) \ {y} },
B(2)X ∗ = { (y,x) | y ∈ E \ X ∗ ∧ x ∈ C(I,X ∗,y) \ {y} }.
Since X ∗ is not a maximum common independent set of O and I, the set X ∗ admits an augmenting
path, which is an alternating path P = (y0,x1,y1, . . . ,xs ,ys ) in GX ∗ with y0,y1, . . . ,ys < X ∗ and
x1,x2, . . . ,xs ∈ X ∗, where X ∗ can be augmented by one element along the path, i.e.,
X ′ = (X ∗ \ {x1,x2, . . . ,xs }) ∪ {y0,y1, . . . ,ys } ∈ I ∩ O.
Now let’s write the pairs of agents and items that correspond to yt and xt as follows:
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• yt = {i(yt ),o(yt )} where i(yt ) ∈ N and o(yt ) ∈ O for t = 0, 1, . . . , s; and
• xt = {i(xt ),o(xt )} where i(xt ) ∈ N and o(xt ) ∈ O for t = 1, 2, . . . , s .
Since each xt (t ∈ [s]) belongs to the unique circuit C(I,X ∗,yt−1), which is contained in the set of
edges incident to i(yt−1) by the observation made in (2.1), we have i(xt ) = i(yt−1) for each t ∈ [s].
is means that along the augmenting path P , each agent i(xt ) receives a new item o(yt−1) and
discards the old item o(xt ).
Now consider the reallocation corresponding to X ′ where agent i(xt ) receives a new item o(yt−1)
but loses the item o(xt ) for each t = 1, 2, . . . , s , and agent i(ys ) receives the item o(ys ). Such a
reallocation increases the valuation of agent i(ys ) by 1, while it does not decrease the valuations of
all the intermediate agents, i(x1), i(x2), . . . , i(xs ), as well as the other agents whose agents do not
appear on P . We thus conclude thatA is Pareto dominated by the new allocation, a contradiction. 
eorem 2.11 above, along with Lemma 2.1, implies that both leximin and MNW allocations are
utilitarian optimal. Next, we show that for the class of (0, 1)-SUB valuations, leximin and MNW
allocations are identical to each other; further, they can be characterized as the minimizers of any
symmetric strictly convex function among all utilitarian optimal allocations.
A function Φ : Zn → R is symmetric if for any permutation pi : [n] → [n],
Φ(z1, z2, . . . , zn) = Φ(zpi (1), zpi (2), . . . , zpi (n)),
and is strictly convex if for any x ,y ∈ Zn with x , y and λ ∈ (0, 1) where λx + (1−λ)y is an integral
vector,
λΦ(x) + (1 − λ)Φ(y) > Φ(λx + (1 − λ)y).
Examples of symmetric, strictly convex functions are the following:
Φ(z1, z2, . . . , zn) ,
n∑
i=1
z2i for zi ∈ Z ∀i ∈ [n];
Φ(z1, z2, . . . , zn) ,
n∑
i=1
zi ln zi for zi ∈ Z≥0 ∀i ∈ [n].
We start by showing that given a non-leximin socially optimal allocation A, there exists an
adjacent socially optimal allocation A which is the result of transferring one item from a ‘happy’
agent j to a less ‘happy’ agent i . e underlying submodularity guarantees the existence of such
allocation. We denote by χi the n-dimensional incidence vector where the j-th component of χi is
1 if j = i , and it is 0 otherwise.
Lemma 2.12. Suppose that agents have (0,1)−SUB valuations. Let A be a utilitarian optimal allo-
cation. If A is not a leximin allocation, then there is another utilitarian optimal allocation A′ such
that
θ (A′) = θ (A) + χi − χj ,
for i, j ∈ [n] with θ (A)j ≥ θ (A)i + 2.
Proof. Let A be an arbitrary utilitarian optimal allocation which is not leximin, and let A∗ be a
leximin allocation. Recall that A∗ is utilitarian optimal by eorem 2.11. Without loss of generality,
we assume that both A and A∗ are clean allocations. Now take a clean allocation A′ that minimizes
the symmetric dierence
∑
i ∈N |A′i4A∗i | over all clean allocation with θ (A′) = θ (A). Assume also
w.l.o.g. that v1(A′1) ≤ v2(A′2) ≤ · · · ≤ vn(A′n). We let vj1 (A∗j1 ) ≤ vj2 (A∗j2 ) ≤ · · · ≤ vjn (A∗jn ). Since A∗
lexicographically dominates A′, for the minimum index k with vj (A′k ) , vjk (A∗jk ),
vk (A′k ) < vjk (A∗jk ). (2.2)
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We note that vh(A′h) = vjh (A∗jh ) for all 1 ≤ h ≤ k − 1. By (2.2), there exists i ∈ [k] with
vi (A′i ) < vi (A∗i ). (2.3)
Indeed, if for all i ∈ [k], vi (A′i ) ≥ vi (A∗i ), the k-th smallest value of realized valuations under A′ is
at least vjk (A∗jk ), contradicting with (2.2). Take the minimum index i satisfying (2.3). Since both A′
and A∗ are clean allocations, we have
|A′i | = vi (A′i ) < vi (A∗i ) = |A∗i |. (2.4)
By minimality, for all h ∈ [i − 1], vh(A′h) ≥ vh(A∗h). In fact, the equality
vh(A′h) = vh(A∗h) (2.5)
holds for all h ∈ [i − 1]. Indeed if vh(A′h) > vh(A∗h) for some h ∈ [i − 1], then h-th smallest
value of the realized valuations under A′ would be strictly greater than that under A∗, yielding
θ (A′) >L θ (A∗), a contradiction.
Now, recall that the family of clean bundles Ih = { S ⊆ O | vh(S) = |S | } for h ∈ N forms
a family of independent sets of a matroid. By (I3) of the independent-set matroid axioms and
by the inequality (2.4), there exists an item o1 ∈ A∗i \ A′i with positive contribution to A′i , i.e.,
vi (A′i ∪ {o1}) = vi (A′i )+ 1. By utilitarian optimality of A′, o1 is allocated to some agent, i.e., o1 ∈ A′i1
for some i1 , i . Consider the following three cases:
• Suppose vi1 (A′i1 ) ≥ vi (A′i ) + 2. en, we obtain a desired allocation by transferring o1 from
i1 to i .
• Supposevi1 (A′i1 ) = vi (A′i )+1. en by transferring o1 from i1 to i , we get another utilitarian
optimal allocation with the same vector as θ (A′), which has a smaller symmetric dierence
than
∑
i ∈N |A′i4A∗i |, a contradiction.
• Suppose vi1 (A′i1 ) ≤ vi (A′i ). We will rst show that vi1 (A′i1 ) ≤ vi1 (A∗i1 ). By (2.5), this clearly
holds if i1 ≤ i . Also, when i1 > i , this means that vi1 (A′i1 ) = vi (A′i ); thus vi1 (A′i1 ) ≤ vi1 (A∗i1 ),
as otherwise the i-th smallest value of realized valuations under A′ would be greater than
that under A∗, contradicting that A∗ is leximin. Further by the facts that |A′i1 \ {o1}| < |A∗i1 |
and that bothA′i1 \ {o1} andA∗i1 are clean (i.e., independent sets of a matroid), there exists an
item o2 ∈ A∗i1 \A′i1 such that vi1 (A′i1 ∪ {o2} \ {o1}) = vi (A′i1 ). Again by utilitarian optimality
of A′, o2 is allocated to some agent, i.e., o2 ∈ A′i2 for some i2 , i1.
Repeating the same argument and leing i0 = i , we obtain a sequence of items and agents
(i0,o1, i1,o2, i2, . . . ,ot , it ) such that
• vih (A′ih ) = vih (A′ih ∪ {oh+1} \ {oh}) for all 1 ≤ h ≤ t − 1; and• oh ∈ A∗ih−1 \A′ih for all 1 ≤ h ≤ t .
See Figure 2 for an illustration of the sequence. If the same agent appears again, i.e., ih = ih′
for some h < h′ ≤ t , then by transferring items along the cycle, we can decrease the symmetric
dierence with A∗, a contradiction. us, the sequence must terminate when we reach the agent it
with vit (A′it ) ≥ vi (A′i ) + 2. Exchanging items along the path, we get a desired allocation. 
o1 o2 · · · ot
Ai0 Ai1 Ai2 Ait
Fig. 2. The path (i0,o1, i1,o2, i2, . . . ,ot , it )
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We further observe that such adjacent allocation improves the value of any symmetric strictly
convex function.
Lemma 2.13. Let Φ : Zn → Z be a symmetric strictly convex function. LetA be a utilitarian optimal
allocation. Let A′ be another utilitarian optimal allocation such that θ (A′) = θ (A) + χi − χj for some
i, j ∈ [n] with θ (A)j ≥ θ (A)i + 2. en Φ(A) > Φ(A′).
Proof. e proof is similar to that of Proposition 6.1 in Frank and Murota [2019a], which shows
the analogous equivalence over the integral base-polyhedron. Let β = θ (A)j − θ (A)i ≥ 2, and
y = θ (A)+β(χi − χj ). us Φ(θ (A)) = Φ(y) by symmetry of Φ. Dene λ = 1− 1β . We have 0 < λ < 1
since β ≥ 2. Observe that
λθ (A) + (1 − λ)y = (1 − 1
β
)θ (A) + 1
β
(θ (A) + β(χi − χj ))
= θ (A) + χi − χj = θ (A′),
which gives us the following inequality (from the strict convexity of Φ): Φ(θ (A)) = λΦ(θ (A)) + (1 −
λ)Φ(θ (A)) > Φ(θ (A′)). 
Now we are ready to prove the following.
Theorem 2.14. Let Φ : Zn → R be a symmetric strictly convex function; let A be some allocation.
For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) A is a minimizer of Φ over all the utilitarian optimal allocations; and
(2) A is a leximin allocation; and
(3) A maximizes Nash welfare.
Proof. To prove 1 ⇔ 2, let A be a leximin allocation, and let A′ be a minimizer of Φ over all
the utilitarian optimal allocations. We will show that θ (A′) is the same as θ (A), which, by the
uniqueness of the leximin valuation vector and symmetry of Φ, proves the theorem statement.
Assume towards a contradiction that θ (A) , θ (A′). By eorem 2.11, we have USW(A) = USW(A′).
By Lemma 2.12, we can obtain another utilitarian optimal allocation A′′ that is a lexicographic
improvement of A′ by decreasing the value of the j-th element of θ (A′) by 1 and increasing the
value of the i-th element of θ (A′) by 1, where θ (A′)j ≥ θ (A′)i + 2. Applying Lemma 2.13, we get
Φ(θ (A′)) > Φ(θ (A′′)), which gives us the desired contradiction.
To prove 2⇔ 3, let A be a leximin allocation, and let A′ be an MNW allocation. Again, we will
show that θ (A′) is the same as θ (A), which by the uniqueness of the leximin valuation vector and
symmetry of NW, proves the theorem statement. Let N>0(A) (respectively, N>0(A′)) be the agent
subset to which we allocate bundles of positive values under leximin allocation A (respectively,
MNW allocation A′). By denition, the number n′ of agents who get positive values under leximin
allocation A is the same as that of MNW allocation A′. Now we denote by θ¯ (A) (respectively, θ¯ (A′))
the vector of the non-zero components vi (Ai ) (respectively, vi (A′i )) arranged in non-decreasing
order. Assume towards a contradiction that θ¯ (A) >L θ¯ (A′). Since A′ maximizes the product
NW(A′) when focusing on N>0(A′) only, the value ∑i ∈N>0(A′) logvi (A′i ) is maximized. However,
ϕ(x) = −∑n′i=1 logxi is a symmetric convex function for x ∈ Zn with each xi > 0. us, by a similar
argument as before, one can show that ϕ(θ¯ (A′)) < ϕ(θ¯ (A)), a contradiction. is completes the
proof. 
e above theorem does not generalize to the non-binary case: Example 2.15 represents an
instance where neither leximin nor MNW allocation is utilitarian optimal.
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Example 2.15. Consider an instance with assignment valuations given as follows. Suppose there
are three groups, each of which contains a single agent, Alice, Bob, and Charlie, respectively, and
three items with weights given in Table 2. e unique leximin and MNW allocation is the allocation
1 2 3
Alice: 2 1 0
Bob: 2 1 0
Charlie: 0 2.9 0.1
Table 2. An instance where neither leximin nor MNW allocation is utilitarian optimal.
that assigns Alice to the rst item, Bob to the second item, and Charlie to the third item; each
agent has positive utility at the allocation and the total utilitarian social welfare is 3.1. However,
the utilitarian optimal allocation assigns Alice to nothing, Bob to the rst item, and Charlie to the
second item, which yields the total utilitarian social welfare 4.9. 
Combining the above characterization with the results of Section 2.3, we get the following
fairness-eciency guarantee for (0, 1)-SUB valuations.
Corollary 2.16. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, any clean leximin or
MNW allocation is EF1.
Proof. Since both leximin and MNW allocations are Pareto-optimal, they maximize the util-
itarian social welfare, by eorem 2.11. By eorem 2.14 and the fact that the function Φ(A) ,∑
i ∈N vi (Ai )2 is a symmetric strictly convex function, any leximin or MNW allocation is a utilitarian
optimal allocation that minimizes Φ(A) among all utilitarian optimal allocations; hence, if such an
allocation is clean, it must be EF1 by Corollary 2.8. 
3 ASSIGNMENT VALUATIONS WITH BINARY GAINS
We now consider the special but practically important case when valuations come from maximum
matchings. For this class of valuations, we show that invoking eorem 2.11, one can nd a leximin
or MNW allocation in polynomial time, by a reduction to the network ow problem. We note
that the complexity of the problem remains open for general submodular valuations with binary
marginal gains.
Theorem 3.1. For assignment valuations with binary marginal gains, one can nd a leximin or
MNW allocation in polynomial time.
Proof. e problem of nding a leximin allocation can be reduced to that of nding an integral
balanced ow in a network, which has been recently shown to be polynomial-time solvable [Frank
and Murota, 2019b]. Specically, for a network D = (V ,A) with source s , sink t , and a capacity
function c : A→ Z, a balanced ow is a maximum integral feasible ow where the out-ow vector
from the source s to the adjacent vertices h is lexicographically maximized among all maximum
integral feasible ows; that is, the smallest ow-value on the edges (s,h) is as large as possible, the
second smallest ow-value on the edges (s,h) is as large as possible, and so on. Frank and Murota
[2019b] show that one can nd a balanced ow in strongly polynomial time (see Section 7 in Frank
and Murota [2019b]).
Now, given an instance of assignment valuations with binary marginal gains, we build the
following instance (V ,A) of a network ow problem. Let Nh denote the set of members in each
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group h. We rst create a source s and a sink t . We create a vertex h for each group h, a vertex i
for each member i of some group, and a vertex o for each item o. We construct the edges of the
network as follows:
• for each group h, create an edge (s,h) with capacitym; and
• for each group h and member i in group h, create an edge (h, i) with unit capacity; and
• for each member i of some group and item o for which i has positive weightuio (i.e. uio = 1),
create an edge (i,o) with unit capacity; and
• for each item o, create an edge (o, t) with unit capacity.
See Figure 3 for an illustration of the network. We will show that an integral balanced ow f : A→
Z of the constructed network corresponds to a leximin allocation. Consider an allocation Af where
each group receives the items o for which some member i of the group has positive ow f (i,o) > 0.
It is easy to see that the allocation Af maximizes the utilitarian social welfare since the ow f is a
maximum integral feasible ow. us, by eorem 2.11, Af has the same utilitarian social welfare
as any leximin allocation. To see balancedness, observe that the amount of ow from the source s
to each group h is the valuation of h for bundle Afh , i.e., f (s,h) =
∑
i ∈Nh f (h, i) = vh(Afh). Indeed if
vh(Afh) > f (s,h), then it would contradict the optimality of the ow f ; and if vh(A
f
h) < f (s,h), it
would contradict the fact that vh(Afh) is the value of a maximum-size matching between A
f
h and
Nh . us, among all utilitarian optimal allocations, Af lexicographically maximizes the valuation
of each group, and hence Af is a leximin allocation. By eorem 2.14, the leximin allocation Af is
also MNW. 
s
Groups Members Items
h
m
m
m
i j t
Fig. 3. An illustrative network flow instance constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1: each edge is either
labeled with its capacity or has unit capacity.
In contrast with assignment valuations with binary marginal gains, we show that the problem of
computing a leximin or MNW allocation becomes NP-hard for weighted assignment valuations
even when there are only two agents.
Theorem 3.2. For two agents with general assignment valuations, it is NP-hard to compute a
leximin or MNW allocation.
Proof. e reduction is similar to the hardness reduction for two agents with identical additive
valuations [Nguyen et al., 2013, Ramezani and Endriss, 2010]. We give a Turing reduction from
Partition. Recall that an instance of Partition is given by a set of positive integers W =
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{w1,w2, . . . ,wm}; it is a ‘yes’-instance if and only if it can be partitioned into two subsets S1 and
S2 ofW such that the sum of the numbers in S1 equals the sum of the numbers in S2.
Consider an instance of PartitionW = {w1,w2, . . . ,wm}. We createm items 1, 2, . . . ,m, two
groups 1 and 2, andm individuals for each group where every individual has a weight w j for item
j. Observe that fore each group, the value of each bundle X is the sum
∑
w j ∈X w j : the number of
members in the group exceeds the number of items in X , and thus one can fully assign each item
to each member of the group.
Suppose we had an algorithm which nds a leximin allocation. Run the algorithm on the
allocation problem constructed above to obtain a leximin allocation A. It can be easily veried that
the instance of Partition has a solution if and only if v1(A1) = v2(A2). Similarly, suppose we had
an algorithm which nds an MNW allocation, and run the algorithm to nd an MNW allocation
A′. Since the valuations are identical, the utilitarian social welfare of the MNW allocation is the
sum
∑
w j ∈W w j , which means that the product of the valuations is maximized when both groups
have the same realized valuation. us, the instance of Partition has a solution if and only if
v1(A′1) = v2(A′2). 
4 DISCUSSION
We studied allocations of indivisible goods under submodular valuations with binary marginal gains
in terms of the interplay among envy, eciency, and various welfare concepts. We showed that
three seemingly disjoint outcomes – minimizers of arbitrary symmetric strictly convex functions
among utilitarian optimal allocations, the leximin allocation, and the MNW allocation – coincide in
this class of valuations. In particular, eorem 2.14 reduces the problem of nding a leximin/MNW
allocation for (0, 1)-SUB valuations to the minimization of the sum of squared valuations subject to
utilitarian optimality, which can be solved eciently in practice using standard solvers for convex
programming. We will conclude with additional implications of this work, some work in progress,
and directions for further research.
Other fairness criteria. e fairness concept we consider here is (approximate) envy-freeness. An
obvious next step is to explore other criteria such as proportionality (each agent gets at least 1/n of
her valuation of the full collection of goods O), the maximin share guarantee or MMS (each agent
gets at least as much value as she would realize if allowed to partition O completely among all
agents knowing the she would receive her least favorite part), equitability (all agents have equal
realized valuations), etc. (see, e.g. [Caragiannis et al., 2016, Freeman et al., 2019] and references
therein for further details) for (0, 1)-SUB valuations. We present our results from a preliminary
exploration of these questions in Appendix B. It is worthwhile to summarize here one of these
results that extends a recent paper by Freeman et al. [2019]. is paper shows that an allocation
that is equitable up to one item or EQ1 (a relaxation of equitability in the same spirit as EF1) and
PO may not exist even for binary additive valuations; however, for this valuation class, it can be
veried in polynomial time whether an EQ1, EF1 and PO allocation exists and, whenever it does
exist, it can also be computed in polynomial time (for the time complexity result, they show that
such an allocation is MNW). We can generalize this result to (0, 1)-OXS valuations: we rst show
that any EQ1 and PO allocation under the (0, 1)-SUB valuation class, if it exists, is leximin, then
invoke Corollary 2.16 to conclude that it must be EF1, and nally eorem 3.1 to establish its
polynomial-time complexity for the (0, 1)-OXS class.
More general valuation functions. Another imperative line of future work is investigating which
of our ndings extend to more general submodular valuations (i.e. those with positive real marginal
gains). An obvious generalization of the (0, 1)-SUB valuation function class is the class of submodular
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valuation functions with subjective binary marginal gains, i.e. ∆i (S ;o) ∈ {0, λi } for some agent-
specic constant λi > 0, for every i ∈ N . For this valuations class that we call (0, λi )-SUB, we can
show that any clean, MNW allocation is still EF1 (clean bundles being dened the same way as for
(0, 1)-SUB valuations) but the leximin and MNW allocations no longer coincide and leximin no
longer implies EF1 (the details are in Appendix C).
For general assignment valuations (i.e. members have positive real weights for items), we have
no theoretical guarantees yet. However, we ran experiments on a real-world dataset, comparing
the performance of a heuristic extension of Algorithm 1 (Section 2.3) to real-valued individual-item
utilities (weights) with Lipton et al. [2004]’s envy graph algorithm in terms of the number of items
wasted (le unassigned or assigned to individuals with zero utility for it although another agent
has positive utility for the item). ese experiments, described in detail in Appendix D, suggest that
approximate envy-freeness can oen be achieved in practice simultaneously with good eciency
guarantees even for this larger valuation class.
It is important to note that the class of rank functions of a matroid (equivalently, (0, 1)-SUB
functions) is a subclass of the gross substitutes (GS) valuations [Gul and Stacchei, 1999, Kelso
and Crawford, 1982]. A promising research direction is to investigate PO+EF1 existence for GS
valuations.
Implications for diversity. Finally, the analysis of submodular valuations ties in with existing
works on diversity in various elds from biology to machine learning (see, e.g. Celis et al. [2016],
Jost [2006]). A popular measurement for how diverse a solution is is to apply one of several
concave functions called diversity indices to the proportions of the dierent entities/aributes
(with respect to which we wish to be diverse) in the solution, e.g. the Shannon entropy and the
Gini-Simpson index: if we denote the maximum USW of one of the problem instances studied in
this paper byU ∗ and agent i’s realized valuation in a utilitarian optimal allocation as ui , then the
above two indices can be expressed as −∑i ∈N (ui/U ∗) ln(ui/U ∗) and 1 −∑i ∈N (ui/U ∗)2 respectively
such that
∑
i ∈N ui = U ∗. us, eorem 2.14 also shows that, for (0, 1)-SUB valuations, the MNW
or leximin principle maximizes among all utilitarian optimal allocations commonly used diversity
indices applied to shares of the agents in the optimal USW. It will be interesting to explore potential
connections of this concept to recent work on so diversity framed as convex function optimization
[Ahmed et al., 2017].
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A APPENDIX: OMITTED PROOFS AND EXAMPLES
A.1 Example where no EF1 allocation is utilitarian optimal
Example A.1. Consider an instance with three items and two agents Alice and Bob having
additive valuations as described in Table 3. e unique allocation maximizing USW is the one which
1 2 3
Alice: 1/4 3/8 3/8
Bob: 0 1/2 1/2
Table 3. An instance where no EF1 allocation is utilitarian optimal.
gives item 1 to Alice and items 2 and 3 to Bob for respective valuations 1/4 and 1. However, even if
either 2 or 3 were dropped from Bob’s bundle, Alice would value it at 3/8 > 1/4; hence, the unique
utilitarian optimal allocation is not EF1 and so no EF1 allocation can be utilitarian optimal. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. Consider subsets of itemsT ⊂ S ⊆ O such that S \T = {o1,o2, . . . ,or } where r = |S \T |.
Dene S0 = ∅ and St = {o1,o2, . . . ,ot } for each t ∈ [r ]. is gives us the following telescoping
series:
vi (S)−vi (T ) =
r∑
t=1
(vi (T∪St )−vi (T∪St−1)) =
r∑
t=1
(vi (T∪St−1∪{ot })−vi (T∪St−1)) =
r∑
t=1
∆i (T∪St−1;ot ).
Since all marginal gains are binary, ∆i (S ∪ St−1;ot ) ≥ 0 for every t ∈ [r ], hence the above identity
implies vi (S) −vi (T ) ≥ 0 for S ⊃ T , i.e. vi is monotone.
Moreover, by seing T = ∅ and noting that ∆i (S ∪ St−1;ot ) ≤ 1 for every t ∈ [r ], we get
vi (S) ≤ vi (∅) + r = 0 + |S \ ∅| = |S |. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. e “if” part: Suppose, there is an item o ∈ S such that ∆i (S \ {o};o) = 0. Now,
by Proposition 2.2, vi (S \ {o}) ≤ |S \ {o}| = |S | − 1 since o ∈ S . is implies that vi (S) =
vi (S \ {o}) + ∆i (S \ {o};o) < |S |. us, by contraposition, if vi (S) = |S |, then ∆i (S \ {o};o) = 1
∀o ∈ S since the marginal gain can be either 0 or 1, i.e. S is a clean bundle for i .
e “only if” part: As in the proof of Proposition 2.2, let S = {o1,o2, . . . ,or }; dene S0 = ∅ and
St = {o1,o2, . . . ,ot } for each t ∈ [r ]. By the denition of cleanness, ∆i (S \ {ot };ot ) = 1 ∀t ∈ [r ].
Since St−1 ⊆ S \ {ot } for every t ∈ [r ], ∆i (St−1;ot ) ≥ ∆i (S \ {ot };ot ) = 1; moreover due to marginal
gains in {0, 1}, we must have ∆i (St−1;ot ) = 1 for every t ∈ [r ]. Hence, vi (S) = ∑rt=1 ∆i (St−1;ot ) =
r = |S |. 
A.4 Example of non-submodular valuations that violate the transferability property
Example A.2. Agent 1 wants to have a pair of matching shoes; her current allocated bundle is a
single red shoe, whereas agent 2 has a matching pair of blue shoes. Agent 1 clearly envies agent 2,
but cannot increase the value of her bundle by taking any one of agent 2’s items. More formally,
suppose N = [2] andO = {rL,bL,bR }; agent 1’s valuation function is: v1(S) = 1 only if {bL,bR } ⊆ S ,
v1(S) = 0 otherwise. Under the allocation A1 = {rL} and A2 = {bL,bR }, v1(A1) < v1(A2) but
∆1(A1;o) = 0 for all o ∈ A2. 
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A.5 Proof of Corollary 2.8
Proof. Take an allocation A′ minimizes the sum of squares of the realized valuations among
all utilitarian optimal allocations. en, there is a clean, utilitarian optimal allocation A that has
the same sum of squares as A′. We will show that A is EF1. Assume towards a contradiction that
A is not EF1. en, there is a pair of agents i, j such that i envies j up to more than 1 item. By
Lemma 2.5, there is an item o ∈ Aj such that ∆i (Ai ;o) = 1. Let A∗ be the allocation achieved by
transferring o from j to i , everything else remaining the same. By Lemma 2.6 and the fact that Aj is
clean, we have
vi (Ai ) ≤ vj (Aj ) + 2,
which implies
∑
i ∈N vi (A∗i )2 <
∑
i ∈N vi (Ai )2 proceeding exactly as in the proof of eorem 2.4 —
another contradiction. Hence, A must be EF1. 
A.6 Example of an EF1 and utilitarian optimal allocation violating EFX0
Example A.3. ere are two groups and four items o1,o2,o3,o4. e rst group N1 has two
members a1,a2 and the second group N2 has three b1,b2,b3; each individual has utility 1 for an
item if and only if she is adjacent to it in the adjoining graph:
a1
a2
o1
o2
o3
o4
b1
b2
b3
e (0, 1)-OXS valuation functions of groups N1 and N2 are denoted byv1(·) andv2(·) respectively.
e allocation A where A1 = {o1} and A2 = {o2,o3,o4} is utilitarian optimal; it is also EF1 since
v1(A1) = 1 = v1(A2 \ {o}) for o ∈ {o2,o3}, with ∆1(A2 \ {o4};o4) = 0, and v2(A2) = 3 > 0 = v2(A1).
A could be the output of Algorithm 1 and is clean and complete. However, A is not EFX0 since
v1(A2 \ {o4}) = 2 > 1 = v1(A1). 
B OTHER FAIRNESS CRITERIA UNDER (0, 1)-SUB VALUATIONS
In the main paper, we have focused on Pareto optimal and EF1 allocations for the (0, 1)-SUB
valuation class. However, many other concepts have been dened and studied in the literature that
formalize dierent intuitive ideas for what it means for an allocation of indivisible goods to be fair.
In this section, we will investigate the implications of our results from the main paper for some
alternative fairness notions.
An allocation A is said to be equitable or EQ if the realized valuations of all agents are equal
under it, i.e. for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N , vi (Ai ) = vj (Aj ); an allocation A is equitable up to one
item or EQ1 if, for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N such that Aj , ∅, there exists some item o ∈ Aj such
that vi (Ai ) ≥ vj (Aj \ {o}) [Freeman et al., 2019].7 We can further relax the equitability criterion up
to an arbitrary number of items: an allocation A is said to be equitable up to c items or EQc if, for
every pair of agents i, j ∈ N such that |Aj | > c , there exists some subset S ∈ Aj of size |S | = c such
that vi (Ai ) ≥ vj (Aj \ S).8
7Note that if Aj = ∅ for some j , vi (Ai ) ≥ vj (Aj ) trivially. Hence the ordered pair (i, j) for any i ∈ N \ {j } could never
prevent the allocation from being EQ1.
8Again, if |Aj | ≤ c for some j , no ordered pair (i, j) for any i ∈ N \ {j } could get in the way of the allocation being EQc .
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Freeman et al. [2019] show9 that, even for binary additive valuations (which is a subclass of
the (0, 1)-OXS valuation class), an allocation that is both EQ1 and PO may not exist; however, in
eorem 4, they establish that it can be veried in polynomial time whether an EQ1, EF1 and
PO allocation exists and, whenever it does exist, it can also be computed in polynomial time —
under binary additive valuations. We will show that the above positive result about computational
tractability extends to the (0, 1)-OXS valuation class. We will begin by proving that under (0, 1)-
SUB valuations, an EQ1 and PO allocation, if it exists, is also EF1 — we achieve this by combining
eorem B.1 below with Corollary 2.8. is simplies the problem of nding an EQ1, EF1 and PO
allocation to that of nding an EQ1 and PO allocation.
Theorem B.1. For submodular valuations with binary marginal gains, any EQ1 and PO allocation,
if it exists, is a leximin allocation.
Hence, from eorem 2.14, we further obtain that if an EQ1 and PO allocation exists under
(0, 1)-SUB valuations, it is also MNW and a minimizer of any symmetric strictly convex function
of agents’ realized valuations among all utilitarian optimal allocations. Moreover, eorem B.1,
together with Corollary 2.16, implies that if an EQ1 and PO allocation exists under (0, 1)-SUB
valuations, it must be EF1.
Proof. Let the optimal USW for a problem instance under this valuation class beU ∗; also, suppose
this instance admits an EQ1 and PO allocation A. e EQ1 property implies that for every pair of
agents i, j ∈ N such that Aj , ∅,
vi (Ai ) ≥ vj (Aj \ {o}) for some o ∈ Aj
= vj (Aj ) − ∆j (Aj \ {o};o)
≥ vj (Aj ) − 1, since ∆j (Aj \ {o};o) ∈ {0, 1}.
is inequality holds trivially and strictly if Aj = ∅. us, maxi ∈N vi (Ai ) ≤ mini ∈N vi (Ai ) + 1. In
other words, there exist a non-negative integer α ≤ U ∗ and a positive integer n0 ∈ [n] such that n0
agents have valuations α each and the remaining agents, if any, have valuations α + 1 each under
allocation A, with U ∗ = n0α + (n − n0)(α + 1) = nα + n − n0. We can write the agents’ realized
valuations under A (with arbitrary tie-breaking) as the n-dimensional vector
θ (A) =
©­­­«α ,α , . . . ,α︸       ︷︷       ︸n0 entries ,α + 1,α + 1, . . . ,α + 1︸                       ︷︷                       ︸n − n0 entries
ª®®®¬ .
If A were not leximin, there would be another allocation A′ for which the corresponding valuation
vector θ (A′) would have an entry strictly higher than that of A at the same position, say n′ ∈ [n]. If
n′ ≤ n0, then every entry of θ (A′) from position n′ is at least α + 1, so the USW under A′ is
U ′ ≥ (n′ − 1)α + (n − n′ + 1)(α + 1)
= nα + n − n′ + 1
≥ nα + n − n0 + 1
= U ∗ + 1.
9Freeman et al. [2019] use an example with 3 agents having binary additive valuations (Example 1). But it is easy to construct
a fair allocation instance with only two agents having binary additive valuations that does not admit an EQ1 and PO
allocation: N = [2]; O = {o1, o2, o3, o4 }; v1(o) = 1 for every o ∈ O ; v2(o1) = 1 and v2(o) = o for every o ∈ O \ {o1 }.
Obviously, any PO allocation must give {o2, o3, o4 } to agent 1 so that this agent’s realized valuation is at least 2 even aer
dropping one of its items; even if agent 2 receives o1, her realized valuation of 1 will always be less than the above.
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If n0 < n′ ≤ n, then similarly,
U ′ ≥ n0α + (n′ − n0 − 1)(α + 1) + (n − n′ + 1)(α + 2)
= nα + 2n − n′ − n0 + 1
≥ nα + 2n − n − n0 + 1
= nα + n − n0 + 1
= U ∗ + 1.
In either case, we have a contradiction since U ∗ is the optimal utilitarian social welfare for this
instance. Hence, A must be leximin. 
We conjecture that a stronger result holds: under (0, 1)-SUB valuations, the leximin allocation is
optimally EQc for c ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} among all PO allocations. A proof or a counterexample remains
elusive. We present this more formally as follows:
Conjecture B.2. For a problem instance where all agents have submodular valuations with binary
marginal gains, any EQ1 and PO allocation, if it exists, if c∗ is the smallest c ∈ [m] for which a leximin
allocation is EQc , then the instance admits no PO allocation that is EQc for any c < c∗.
C SUBMODULARITY WITH SUBJECTIVE BINARY GAINS
An obvious generalization of the (0, 1)-SUB valuation function class is the class of submodular
valuation functions with subjective binary marginal gains: agent i’s bundle-valuation function
vi (·) is said to have subjective binary marginal gains if ∆i (S ;o) ∈ {0, λi } for some agent-specic
constant λi > 0, for every i ∈ N . We dene clean bundles and clean allocations for this function
class exactly as we did for (0, 1)-SUB valuations in Section 2.
Understandably, most of the properties of allocations under (0, 1)-SUB valuations do not extend
to this more general seing. It is obvious that Pareto optimality does not imply utilitarian optimality
(e.g. consider an instance with two agents and one item which the agents value at 1 and 2
respectively: assigning the item to agent 1 is PO but not utilitarian optimal). Moreover, the
leximin allocation may not be EF1, as shown by the following example where both agents have
additive valuations.
Example C.1. Suppose N = [2]; O = {o1,o2,o3,o4}; the valuations are additive with v1({o1}) = 0,
v1({o}) = 1 ∀o ∈ O \ {o1}, and v2({o}) = 3 ∀o ∈ O . It is straightforward to check that the unique
leximin allocation is A1 = {o1,o2,o3}, A2 = {o4}. Under this allocation, v1(A2) = 0 < 3 = v1(A1),
but v2(A1 \ {o}) = 6 > 3 = v2(A2) for every o ∈ A1 — in fact, at least two (any two) items must be
removed from A1 for agent 2 to stop envying agent 1. 
Note another dierence of this valuation class from (0, 1)-SUB that is also evidenced by Exam-
ple C.1: the leximin and MNW allocations may not coincide. In this example, any allocation A
that gives two of the items {o2,o3,o4} to agent 1 and the rest to agent 2 is MNW, with v1(A1) = 2
and v2(A2) = 6, so that NW(A) = 12; such an allocation is also EF1 (in fact, envy-free) since
v1(A2) = 1 < 2 = v1(A1) and v2(A1) = 6 = v2(A2). is is not an accident, as the following theorem
shows.
Theorem C.2. For agents having submodular valuation functions with subjective binary marginal
gains, any clean, MNW allocation is EF1.
Since our valuation functions are still submodular, the transferability property (Lemma 2.5) still
holds. Two other components of the proof of eorem C.2 are natural extensions of Propositions 2.3
and Lemma 2.6 — Proposition C.3 and Lemma C.4 below, respectively:
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Proposition C.3. For submodular valuations with subjective binary marginal gains dened by
agent-specic positive constants λi ∀i ∈ N , A is a clean allocation if and only if vi (Ai ) = λi |Ai | for
each i ∈ N .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary bundle S ⊆ O such that S = {o1,o2, . . . ,or } for some r ∈ [m]
w.l.o.g. Let S0 = ∅ and St = St−1 ∪ {ot } for every t ∈ [r ]. en, an arbitrary agent i’s valuation of
bundle S under marginal gains in {0, λi } is
vi (S) =
r∑
t=1
∆i (St−1;ot ) ≤
r∑
t=1
λi = λir = λi |S |. (C.1)
Now, if agent i’s allocated bundle under an allocation A has a valuation vi (Ai ) = λi |Ai |, then her
marginal gain for any item in o ∈ Ai is given by
vi (Ai ) −vi (Ai \ {o}) = λi |Ai | −vi (Ai \ {o})
≥ λi |Ai | − λi (|Ai | − 1)
= λi > 0,
where the rst inequality follows from Inequality (C.1) and the fact that |Ai \ {o}| = |Ai | − 1. is
means that the bundle Ai is clean and, since this holds for every i , the allocation is clean. is
completes the proof of the “if” part.
If allocationA is clean, then we must have ∆i (Ai \{o};o) > 0 for every o ∈ Ai for every i ∈ N . Let
us dene an arbitrary agent i’s bundle Ai as S above, so that |Ai | = r . en, since St−1 ⊆ Ai \ {ot }
for every t ∈ [r ], submodularity dictates that
∆i (St−1;ot ) ≥ ∆i (Ai \ {ot };ot ) > 0 ∀t ∈ [r ].
Since ∆i (St−1;ot ) ∈ {0, λi } with λi > 0, the above inequality implies that ∆i (St−1;ot ) = λi ∀t ∈ [r ].
Hence,
vi (Ai ) =
r∑
t=1
∆i (St−1;ot ) =
r∑
t=1
λi = λir = λi |Ai |.
is completes the proof of the “only if” part. 
Lemma C.4. For submodular functions with subjective binary marginal gains, if agent i envies
agent j up to more than 1 item under clean allocation A, then |Aj | ≥ |Ai | + 2.
Proof. Since i envies j underA up to more than 1 item, we must haveAj , ∅ andvi (Ai ) < vi (Aj \
{o}) for every o ∈ Aj . Consider one such o. From Inequality (C.1) in the proof of Proposition C.3,
vi (Aj \ {o}) ≤ λi |Aj \ {o}| = λi (|Aj | − 1). Since A is clean, vi (Ai ) = λi |Ai |. Combining these, we get
λi |Ai | = vi (Ai ) < vi (Aj \ {o}) ≤ λi (|Aj | − 1).
Since λi > 0, we have |Ai | < |Aj | − 1, i.e. |Ai | ≤ |Aj | − 2 because |Ai | and |Aj | are integers. 
We are now ready to prove eorem C.2.
Proof of Theorem C.2. Our proof non-trivially extends that of eorem 3.2 of Caragiannis
et al. [2016]. We will rst address the case when it is possible to allocate items in such a way that
each agent has a positive realized valuation for its bundle, i.e. Nmax = N in the denition of an
MNW allocation, and then tackle the scenario Nmax ( N .
Consider a pair of agents 1, 2 ∈ N w.l.o.g. such that 1 envies 2 up to two or more items, if possible,
under an MNW allocation A. Since every agent has a positive realized valuation under A, we have
vi (Ai ) = λi |Ai | > 0, i.e. |Ai | > 0 for each i ∈ {1, 2}. From Lemma 2.5, we know that there is an
item in A2 for which agent 1 has positive marginal utility – consider any one such item o ∈ A2.
25
us, ∆1(A1;o) > 0, i.e. ∆1(A1;o) = λ1; also, since A2 is a clean bundle, ∆2(A2 \ {o};o) > 0, i.e.
∆2(A2 \ {o};o) = λ2.
Let us convert A to a new allocation A′ by only transferring this item o from agent 2 to agent 1.
Hence, v1(A′1) = v1(A1) + ∆1(A1;o) = v1(A1) + λ1, v2(A′2) = v2(A2) − ∆2(A2 \ {o};o) = v2(A2) − λ2,
vi (A′i ) = vi (Ai ) for each i ∈ N \ {1, 2}. NW(A) is positive since A is MNW and Nmax = N . Hence,
NW(A′)
NW(A) =
[
v1(A1) + λ1
v1(A1)
] [
v2(A2) − λ2
v2(A2)
]
=
[
1 + λ1
v1(A1)
] [
1 − λ2
v2(A2))
]
=
[
1 + λ1
λ1 |A1 |
] [
1 − λ2
λ2 |A2 |
]
=
[
1 + 1|A1 |
] [
1 − 1|A2 |
]
= 1 + |A2 | − |A1 | − 1|A1 | |A2 | ,
≥ 1 + (|A1 | + 2) − |A1 | − 1|A1 | |A2 | ,
≥ 1 + 1|A1 | |A2 | ,
> 1.
Here, the third equality comes from Proposition C.3 since A is clean, and the rst inequality from
Lemma C.4 due to our assumption. But NW(A′) > NW(A) contradicts the optimality of A, implying
that any agent can envy another up to at most 1 item under A.
is completes the proof for the Nmax = N case. e rest of the proof mirrors the corresponding
part of the proof of Caragiannis et al. [2016]’s eorem 3.2. If Nmax ( N , it is easy to see that there
can be no envy towards any i < Nmax: this is because we must have vi (Ai ) = 0 for any such i from
the denition of Nmax, which in turn implies that Ai = ∅ since A is clean; hence, vj (Ai ) = 0 for
every j ∈ N . Also, for any i, j ∈ Nmax, we can show exactly as in the proof for the Nmax = N case
above that there cannot be envy up to more than one item between them, since A maximizes the
Nash welfare over this subset of agents Nmax. Suppose for contradiction that an agent i ∈ N \Nmax
envies some j ∈ Nmax up to more than one item under A. en, from Lemma 2.5, there is one item
o1 ∈ Aj w.l.o.g. such that vi ({o1}) = ∆i (∅;o1) = ∆i (Ai ;o1) > 0. Moreover, since A is clean,
vj (Aj \ {o1}) = vj (Aj ) − ∆j (Aj \ {o1};o1)
= λj |Aj | − λj
= λj (|Aj | − 1)
≥ λj (|Ai | + 1)
= λj > 0,
where the rst inequality comes from Lemma C.4. us, if we transfer o1 from j to i and leave all
other bundles unchanged, then every agent in Nmax ∪ {i} will have a positive valuation under the
new allocation. is contradicts the maximality of Nmax. Hence, any i ∈ N \Nmax must be envy-free
up to one item towards any j ∈ Nmax. 
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D GENERAL ASSIGNMENT VALUATIONS
In this section, we introduce an extension of the envy-induced transfers (Algorithm 1) to general
valuations, as described in Algorithm 2. Recall that the general principle is to iteratively eliminate
envy by transfering an item from the envied bundle to the envied bundle until no agent is envied up
to more than one item. Here at each iteration step, we transfer the item that induces the maximal
increase in overall utility (see lines 3-6). Note that, since agent j loses one of her items, she may
develop a positive marginal utility for a currently withheld item; in that case, the item in A0 for
which she has maximal marginal utility is given to her (see lines 6-8). Note also that, for arbitrary
utilities, if an agent i acquires a new item o due to an envy-induced transfer, at most one of her
previous items, say o∗, may become unused, e.g. if i’s positive marginal utility for o with her
previous bundle Ai was due to the fact that the individual who was assigned item o∗ has a higher
utility for o than o∗ and no other indivual prefers o∗ to its assigned item. In that case, item o∗ is
revoked from agent i and allocated to the agent with maximal and strictly positive marginal utility
for it (see lines 10-13). If this creates another unused item, we repeat the process until there are no
unused items or the unused item has zero marginal utility for all agents – in the laer case, the
unused item is added to the withheld set (see lines 14-18).
We now provide numerical results to compare the loss incurred by Algorithm 2 and that of PL
the extension of [Lipton et al., 2004] algorithm to groups of agents, as presented in [Benabbou et al.,
2019]. e performances of these procedure are estimated both in terms of percentage of items
wasted (Waste) and price of fairness (PoF) which is formally dened as follows:
PoF (P) = max{USW(A) | A is an allocation}
USW(A(P))
where A(P) is the allocation returned by a given procedure P . In our experiments, we use the
dataset called “MovieLens-ml-1m” which contains approximately 1,000,000 ratings (from 0 to 5)
of 4,000 movies made by 6,000 users [Harper and Konstan., 2015]. To generate an instance of our
allocation problem, we select 200 movies at random (|O | = 200) and then we only consider the
users that rated at least one of these movies. We use the user ratings as individual utilities. We
consider the following user partitions:
• Gender: 2 agents (male or female),
• Age: 7 agents representing the 7 age-groups,
and the following agents’ valuations:
• Ratings:
vi (S) = max{
∑
u ∈Ni
ru,pi (u) | pi ∈ Π(Ni , S) }
where ruo is the rating of movie o made by user u,
• Norm: v ′i (S) = vi (S)/vi (O),
for all agents i ∈ N representing a group of users and for all bundles of movies S ⊆ O . e results
given in Table 4 are averaged over 50 runs.
In Table 4, we observe that PL the extension of [Lipton et al., 2004] algorithm to groups may
be wasteful but in practice it has almost zero-waste and also good PoF (the lower the beer). In
comparison, Algorithm 2 the extension of the envy-induced transfers to general valuations is
guaranteed to be non-wasteful but in practice it has larger PoF than PL .
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Algorithm 2: Envy-Induced Transfers for general valuations
1 Compute a clean, socially optimal allocation.
2 /**Envy-Induced Transfers and Reallocations**/
3 while ∃i, j ∈ N such that i envies j up to more than 1 item do
4 Pick i , j, o maximizing ∆i (Ai ;o) + ∆(Aj ;o) over all i, j ∈ N and all o ∈ O such that i envies j more
than 1 item and ∆i (Ai ;o) > 0.
5 Aj ← Aj\{o}; Ai ← Ai ∪ {o}.
6 if ∃o ∈ A0 such that ∆j (Aj ;o) > 0 then
7 Pick o ∈ A0 that maximizes ∆j (Aj ;o).
8 Aj ← Aj ∪ {o}.
9 end
10 if ∃o∗ ∈ Ai that is unused then
11 Ai ← Ai\{o∗}; revoked = true.
12 while revoked = true and ∃k s.t. ∆(Ak ;o∗)>0 do
13 Allocate o∗ to agent k maximizing ∆(Ak ;o∗).
14 if ∃o ∈ Ak that is unused then
15 Ak ← Ak\{o}; o∗ ← o.
16 else revoked = false.
17 end
18 if revoked = true then A0 ← A0 ∪ {o∗}.
19 end
20 end
PL Algorithm 2
Types Ratings Norm Ratings Norm
PoF Age 1.01 1.15 1.05 1.19
Waste Age 1.25 0.20 0.00 0.00
PoF Gender 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.03
Waste Gender 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4. Performances of allocation procedures.
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